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Abstract
We study individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship
networks using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In the experi-
ment subjects are shown a network, in which their location is exogenously assigned,
and they are then asked questions about the network after it disappears. We find
that subjects exhibit three main cognitive biases: (i) they underestimate the mean
degree compared to the actual network; (ii) they overestimate the number of rare
degrees; (iii) they underestimate the number of frequent degrees. We then analyze
survey data from two ‘real’ friendship networks from a Silicon Valley firm and from
a University Research Center. We find, somewhat remarkably, that individuals in
these real networks also exhibit these biases.
The experiments yield three further findings: (iv) network cognition is affected
by the subject’s location, (v) the accuracy of network cognition varies with the
nature of the network, and (vi) network cognition has a significant effect on economic
decisions.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research argues that the structure of social
networks is a crucial determinant of individual behavior and welfare.1 In light of the recent
development of social networking sites and tools, individuals have arguably become even
more aware of the structure of the social relationships in which they are embedded.2
However, learning and using information about network structure is far from being a
simple task. A salient feature of networks is their complexity: there are thousands of
potential network configurations even in a group with just a dozen members. Moreover,
the nature of social interactions often makes it difficult to record or access information
other than through memory, making this a cognitively demanding task.
The objective of this paper is to investigate individual cognition of social networks.
Is there significant heterogeneity in the way individuals process, recall and use network
information? Are there common systematic biases? Do they affect individuals’ economic
decisions? These are some of the questions we address. A distinctive feature of our work
is that we use data drawn from a combination of laboratory experiments and surveys
from the field. We examine the cognition of the distribution of connections (the so called
‘degree’ distribution) and how cognition varies with location in the network.3 Our focus
on the distribution of connections is motivated by recent theoretical research highlighting
its key role in understanding individual behavior and in investigating aggregate social and
economic dynamics in networks.4
In the laboratory experiment, we use the following novel methodology: subjects are
shown a graphical representation of an imaginary friendship network and they are (ran-
domly) assigned to be a node in the network. After a fixed amount of time (typically 1
minute5), the network disappears and subjects are asked questions about the structure
of friendship relations in the group. For instance, the question ”How many people in the
group (including yourself) have exactly x friends?” allows us to generate the subjects’
perception of the degree distribution by aggregating the answers for the different values
of x.
We find substantial individual heterogeneity in network cognition. However, three
main biases emerge clearly. First, subjects underestimate the average degree in the net-
work. The cognitive mean degree is (roughly) 4 while the actual mean degree is over 4.6.
1See Goyal [2007], Jackson [2008] and Vega-Redondo [2007] for overviews of this work.
2In a special report, the Economist magazine asserts that “social-networking sites [...] have made
people’s personal relationships more visible and quantifiable than ever before”(”A world of connections,”
The Economist, January 28, 2010).
3The degree of a node is the number of its direct connections. The degree distribution in a network
tells us the number of nodes with different degrees. For formal definitions refer to section 2.
4See Galeotti et al. [2010] for a study of the relationship between network degree distributions and
strategic behavior, and Vega-Redondo [2007] for an exposition of the literature which relates a variety of
dynamic processes in networks to the underlying degree distribution.
5We decided to allocate one minute for most experiments after obtaining feedback from a pilot.
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Second, subjects overestimate the number of rare types in the network, where the ”type”
of a node is its degree. Specifically, they perceive that there exist individuals of types 1,
2, 5, 6, and 8, which are actually absent from the real network. Third, they underestimate
the number of frequent types in the network : there are five nodes for each of types 3, 4
and 7 and subjects perceive a significantly lower number.
The laboratory setting allows a researcher to control the parameters of the experiment,
but this tight control raises questions about the scope of the findings. The first issue is
internal validation: are our findings sensitive to the specific networks used and the par-
ticular visualizations of the chosen networks? The second issue is external validation: do
these biases also arise in actual social networks or are they an artifact of the experimen-
tal methodology? We address these concerns by analyzing two well-known survey data
sets on social networks. The first data set is the friendship network of a Silicon Valley
firm, which was first studied in Krackhardt [1987]. The second data set is the friendship
network in a University Research Center, which was first studied in Casciaro [1998].
We show that individual cognition of the real friendship networks in these two data
sets exhibits the three main biases identified in our experimental work. In particular,
individuals in the Silicon Valley firm network perceive a lower mean connectivity than
the true mean, they overestimate rare types and underestimate (almost all) frequent
types. Individuals in the University Research Center network perceive a lower mean
connectivity than the true mean, they overestimate (most) rare types and underestimate
(most) frequent types. This congruence of findings from our experiment and from the field
data is, in our view, quite striking. It provides corroborating evidence of the existence of
the specific cognitive biases that we identified in the laboratory experiments. Moreover, it
allows us to make a more general methodological point: the network cognition processes
in the laboratory appear to be similar to the cognition processes of individuals located in
actual social networks.
The laboratory methodology enables us to make three important additional contribu-
tions relative to the analysis of survey data. First, we are able to investigate in a clean
way location effects: by randomly assigning subjects to different nodes in the network,
we can avoid the endogeneity problems typically present in survey data. We find that
indeed location affects cognition: low and high ”type” (degree) subjects differ in their
perception of the network along a number of dimensions, such as perception of other low
types, the identity of key individuals in the network, and the dispersion of the perceived
mean degree. Second, we are able to study whether the accuracy of network cognition
varies with the architecture of the network : we find that a mean preserving spread of the
degree distribution leads to greater cognitive accuracy.6 Third, we are able to investigate
whether network cognition affects subjects’ economic decisions. Having answered a range
of questions designed to probe how they process and recall network information, our sub-
jects then face two decision problems. Both involve a decision to contribute in a network
6For formal definitions see section 2.
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public good game, where other players’ contribution decisions are assigned by the exper-
imenter and communicated to the subject, thereby removing any strategic uncertainty.
The subject therefore faces what would be a very simple decision problem if she had
complete knowledge of the network: in one problem, the payoff-maximizing strategy is to
contribute, while in the other it is more profitable not to contribute. However, the subject
does not have access to network information while making her decision: she has to rely
on her memory. The memory task is more demanding in one of the decision problems.
We find, as expected, that in this case subjects are less likely to choose the action that
maximizes their monetary payoff. Moreover, two measures of an individual’s cognitive
accuracy obtained in the earlier part of the experiment significantly predict behavior.
The first is a measure of how accurately the individual perceives very low (degree) types
in the network. This is particularly relevant for one of the decision problems, and indeed
its effect is only significant for that problem. The second measures one of the cognitive
biases we identified earlier, namely the tendency to overestimate the number of rare types
in the network. This bias appears to increase the probability of contribution to the public
good in both problems, suggesting that subjects with a very inaccurate perception of the
network are unable to pick the payoff-maximizing strategy.
The remaining part of this section surveys the related literature. Section 2 introduces
basic concepts on networks and explains the design of the experiment. Section 3 presents
the main results of the laboratory experiment. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis
of the survey-based data sets. Section 5 presents further results from the laboratory
experiments. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the instructions which were
shown to the subjects participating in the experiment, and Appendix B contains all the
network images which were displayed to subjects in the various treatments.
1.1 Literature review
The study of network cognition is still a largely unexplored area and, to the best of our
knowledge, the present paper is the first in economics to study network cognition. So we
see it as a stepping stone to further experimental/empirical work which can be used to
assess existing theory and also as an input to formulate more realistic assumptions on
network cognition in theoretical models.7
In the psychology and behavioral economics literature there has been a sustained in-
terest in the calibration of probabilities. Early contributions include Alpert and Raiffa
[1969/1982]; for a survey see Tversky and Kahneman [1982]. This research elicits indi-
viduals’ confidence intervals for quantities they do not know. The findings suggest that
confidence intervals are too narrow, implying that subjective probability distributions
are too ‘tight’: individuals assign relatively too much weight to ‘middle’ values and too
7Existing experimental work on networks in economics typically provides subjects with specific network
information; for an interesting recent paper in this tradition, see Charness et al. [2011].
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little weight to values at the ‘periphery’ of the distribution. Our work has two novel
features in relation to this body of work. First, we study distributions in the context of
networks. Second, we find that individuals exhibit three specific biases: underestimation
of the mean number of connections, overestimation of rare types and underestimation of
frequent types.8
In a series of influential contributions, Robin Dunbar and his collaborators (see Dunbar
[1998]) have proposed and empirically studied the ”social brain hypothesis”: a specific
part of the brain (the neocortex) deals with processing and synthesizing information on
social relationships, and therefore the volume of the neocortex is a constraint on the
maximum group size. Several empirical studies on both humans and different primate
species support the social brain hypothesis (see Dunbar [2003] for a comprehensive review).
This work has received wide attention, and the approximate threshold of 150 for group
size for humans is popularly known as ”Dunbar’s number.” Our work shares Dunbar’s
research premise that there are cognitive constraints in individuals’ ability to process and
recall information about human relationships. However, we focus on the consequences of
these constraints for individuals’ perception of the structure of their social environment,
instead of Dunbar’s focus on the consequences for the size of social groups.
In social psychology there is an active research programme on the study of network
cognition using a survey-based methodology (see Moreno [1960], Newcomb [1961], Roeth-
lisberger and Dickson [1939] and Krackhardt [1987].) In recent years, Kumbasar et al.
[1994], Krackhardt and Kilduff [1999], Casciaro [1998], Smith et al. [2011], and others
have used this methodology to identify a variety of cognitive biases in network percep-
tion. There are three main differences between this literature and our work. The first
difference is about the object of study: their work focuses on the cognition of specific ties,
while we study the degree distribution which is a statistic about the whole network. The
second difference concerns methodology: existing work has, with a few exceptions, used
only surveys of real networks, while our primary source of data comes from a laboratory
experiment. The laboratory setting allows an unambiguous identification of the effects of
network location on cognition, which is not typically possible using only survey data. We
then exploit the methodological complementarity between survey based work and the ex-
perimental approach by re-analyzing the data from two surveys, from Krackhardt [1987]
and Casciaro [1998], to validate our experimental work. The third difference is that we
investigate the link between network cognition and economic decisions.
8There is a distinguished tradition of work on perception of distributions in the context of choice
under uncertainty. Early work by Preston and Baratta [1948] suggested that individuals overestimate
returns from gambles with low probability of success and underestimate returns from gambles with high
probability of success. In prospect theory, these, and related observations, have been reconciled through
the assignment of non-linear weights to probabilities of uncertain events. In particular, the evidence is
consistent with low probabilities being assigned large weights and high probabilities being assigned small
weights, see Kahneman and Tversky [1979] and Wakker [2010].
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2 Set-up
Section 2.1 introduces some basic notation and definitions on networks. Section 2.2 de-
scribes the set-up of the experiments.
2.1 Basic notation
It is useful to briefly introduce some basic concepts and notation on networks. Let N =
{1, 2, , 3, ...n} be a set of nodes; in our experiments, n = 15. Denote by gij ∈ {0, 1} a
friendship between two nodes i and j, so the variable gij takes on a value of 1 if there exists
a friendship between i and j, and a value of 0 otherwise. The set of nodes taken along with
the friendships between them defines a network denoted by g. Let Ni(g) = {j|gij = 1}
denote the nodes with whom node i shares a friendship relation; this set will be referred
to as the friends of i. Let ηi(g) = |Ni(g)| denote the degree of node i, which is the number
of friends of node i in g. We will refer to the degree of a node as its type. The mean
degree in network g is defined as ηˆ(g) =
∑
i∈N ηi(g)/n.
Let Nk(g) be the number of nodes in network g with degree equal to k. The degree
distribution in a network is a vector P , where P (k) = |Nk(g)|/n is the fraction of nodes
with degree k. This degree distribution has support on D = {0, 1, 2, ..., n − 1}. The
degree distribution allows for an elegant way to study changes in network structure.
In particular, the idea of redistributing links is captured by a Mean Preserving Spread
(MPS) of the degree distribution. Given a degree distribution P , let the cumulative
distribution function be denoted by P : {1, 2, ..., n− 1} → [0, 1], where:
P (η) =
η∑
x=0
P (x) . (1)
Let P and P ′ be two degree distributions defined on {0, 1, 2..., n − 1} and P and P ′ the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions.
Definition 1. P ′ is a mean preserving spread (MPS) of P if and only if P and P ′ have
the same mean and
x∑
k=1
P (k) ≤
x∑
k=1
P ′ (k) (2)
for every k ∈ {1, 2, ...n− 1}.
A simple example of a MPS shift for a network with n = 4 nodes arises when we
move from a line network in which g12 = g23 = g34 = 1 to a star network in which
g12 = g13 = g14 = 1.
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2.2 Experimental Design
The main experiments were conducted at the University of Cambridge and programmed
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [2007]).9 Subjects were recruited using the online
recruitment system ORSEE; they received a fixed participation fee of £3 plus additional
earnings depending on their performance in the experiment, according to the rules detailed
in the Experimental Instructions (see Appendix A). In total 80 subjects participated in the
experiments. The subjects were all students of the University of Cambridge. Two subjects
did not provide information about their gender or educational status when completing
the personal questionnaire after the end of the experiment. Of the 78 who did, 37 were
male and 41 female students; 45 were undergraduates and the remainder were graduates;
19 were studying for a degree in economics, business or finance, while the remainder were
drawn from a wide variety of other disciplines.
Each session consisted of 4 different experiments (referred to as ”stages” in the in-
structions). In the first 2 experiments, the focus is on network perception, while in the
last 2 experiments we study individual decision making in a context where knowledge of
the network is important. In the present paper, our focus is on cognition of the overall
structure of the network and therefore we will present the results of the first two experi-
ments. Moreover, we will also present the results of experiments 3 and 4 which show that
limitations in network cognition affect economic behavior.10
At the beginning of each session, after signing informed consent forms, subjects chose
randomly their ID codes and then sat in front of a computer. Each subject typed in
his/her ID code and all data was collected anonymously, identified only by the ID code.
The instructions in Appendix A appeared on their screens.
In the first 2 experiments subjects are shown a graphical representation of a network
for a given length of time, and then they are asked questions about it after the network
has disappeared. The subjects are instructed to imagine that the nodes of the network
represent other students in the university, and that connecting lines between nodes repre-
sent friendships. In each experiment there are two treatments. All subjects see the same
network, but subjects in a treatment condition will see a different node colored in ‘red’
and labeled ”YOU”, relative to subjects in the other treatment. Here is a more detailed
summary of the first 2 experiment; all the figures referred to in the text are in Appendix
B:
• Experiment 1 - Degree distribution. Subjects are shown the network at the
top of figure 11 (first treatment) or the network at the bottom of figure 11 (second
9A pilot was conducted at the Toulouse School of Economics Experimental Laboratory.
10After the experiments 1 and 2 on network perception, we conduct a pilot for future experimental
work that focuses on the perception of specific links in the network. This pilot had the additional purpose
of creating a break between the experiments focusing on perception and the ones focusing on individual
decision making. In the instructions, see Appendix A, the pilot is referred to as stage 3 and therefore
experiments 3 and 4 are referred to as stages 4 and 5 respectively.
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treatment) for 60 seconds. After the network disappears they are asked a number
of questions, including questions such as ”How many people in the group (including
yourself) have exactly x friends?” which allow us to generate subjects’ perception
of the degree distribution.
• Experiment 2 - Changes in the network. In the first treatment subjects are
shown the network at the top of figure 12 for 30 seconds, and then the network at
the bottom of figure 12 for 30 seconds. Note that the second network is a mean
preserving spread of the first network. In the second treatment subjects are first
shown the network at the top of figure 13 followed by the network at the bottom of
figure 13: the only difference between treatments, apart from the assigned location,
is that the mean preserving spread network is shown before the original network in
the second treatment. The subjects are then asked a number of questions about the
two networks, which are different from the questions asked in Experiment 1.
In experiments 3 and 4 subjects are shown a graphical representation of a network
for 60 seconds, and then they have to make a choice which depends on their ability to
remember who their friends (and friends of friends) are. The decision problem is akin to
a binary-action best-shot game with a threshold. Subjects are given an endowment of
2 pounds, they are shown the network, and after the network disappears they are told
which other individuals in the network have decided to contribute. The choice that they
face is whether to contribute or not. If they contribute and a minimum number of friends
(and friends of friends) also contribute then they earn an additional 4 pounds, otherwise
they lose their endowment. There is a unique treatment so all subjects are assigned to
the same node in the network and they are told the same information about the names
of the other individuals who contribute. This is a more detailed summary of the last two
experiments, all the figures referred to in the text are in Appendix B:
• Experiment 3 - Unknown decision problem. First, subjects are simply told
that they are going to face a decision problem with real monetary payoffs, and that
the effects of decisions on payoffs will depend on the way players are connected.
They are then shown the network at the top of Figure 15 for 60 seconds. Second,
the network disappears and they are told about the decision problem: they earn
4 pounds if the sum of their contribution, the contributions made by each of their
friends, and the contributions made by each friend’s friends, is equal to or more
than 6 pounds. Finally, they are told the names of the individuals in the network
who contributed, and they are asked whether they want to contribute or not.
• Experiment 4 - Known decision problem. First, subjects are told about the
decision problem: they earn 4 pounds if the sum of their contribution and the
contributions made by each of their friends is equal to or more than 4 pounds.
Second, subjects are shown the network at the bottom of figure 15 for 60 seconds.
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Finally, they are told the names of the individuals in the network who contributed,
and they are asked whether they want to contribute or not.
3 Experimental results on cognition
In Experiment 1 we asked subjects to recall the degree distribution of the network in figure
1. Figure 2 shows the perceived mean and the perceived variance for each subject in the
experiment, the black circles denote subjects assigned to be high type and the hollow
triangles denote subjects assigned to be low type. The data reveal that this cognitive
task is rather demanding and there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in subjects’ reports.
Figure 3 shows the aggregated data for all subjects within the same treatment: it com-
pares the degree distribution of the actual network (in black) with the degree distribution
of the cognitive networks of subjects assigned to high (in gray) and low (in white) type.
To test whether differences between the real and the cognitive networks are statistically
significant, we used two types of test: standard t-tests for equality of means, and the
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, where for each subject the ”control” outcome was the actual
network (i.e. the outcome that would obtain with perfect recall) and the ”treatment”
outcome was the outcome of the experiment (i.e. the outcome subject to cognitive con-
straints). The results were very similar for the two tests, so we only report those for the
t-tests. We observe three main biases in subjects’ perception of the degree distribution
of the network.
The first bias is that subjects underestimate the mean degree in the network. The
cognitive degree distribution of high type subjects has mean degree 4.194 and the cognitive
degree distribution of low type subjects has mean degree 4.047. These perceived means
are significantly lower than the actual mean degree, which is 4.667 (p = 0.000).11
The second bias is that subjects overestimate the number of rare types in the network.
On average they perceive that there exist individuals of types 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 even though
they are absent in the actual network. The third bias is that subjects underestimate the
number of frequent types in the network. There are five nodes for each of types 3, 4 and
7 in the actual network, but subjects on average perceive a significantly lower number.
Table 1 shows that these biases are statistically significant independently of the subject’s
exogenously assigned location in the network.12
There are two further differences between the real and perceived distributions, which
we believe are a consequence of the last two biases for the specific network that we used
in the experiment. The first difference is that subjects tend to perceive the presence of a
larger number of types than there are in the actual network. In the actual network there
11A p-value of 0.000 denotes significance at the 0.001 level.
12There is one notable exception which is discussed in detail in section 5.1: low type (d = 3) subjects
on average perceive the correct number of degree 3 nodes in the network. We argue there that this is due
to the presence of an offsetting ”projection” bias.
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Figure 1: Network pictures shown to subjects in experiment 1. Top: Treatment 1 - High
type with degree=7. Bottom: Treatment 2 - Low type with degree=3.
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Figure 2: Perceived mean and variance for each subject. Black circles indicate subjects
assigned to be high type and hollow triangles indicate subjects assigned to be low type.
Figure 3: Degree distribution for the actual network (in black) and for the cognitive
networks averaged out over all subjects assigned to be high (in gray) and low (in white)
type.
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Cognitive-Actual High-Low
High type Low type Type
Type 1 0.528*** 0.410** 0.118
Type 2 1.611*** 1.923*** -0.312
Type 3 -0.806*** 0.179 -0.985*
Type 4 -0.861* -1.872*** 1.011
Type 5 2.222*** 1.949*** 0.273
Type 6 1.917*** 1.385*** 0.532
Type 7 -3.194*** -3.385*** 0.191
Type 8 0.361*** 0.462* -0.101
Number of types 2.528*** 2.077*** 0.450
Mean degree -0.472*** -0.619*** 0.147
Variance -0.526*** -0.844*** 0.318
Table 1: Second and third columns: Difference between cognitive and actual networks.
Last column: difference between cognitive networks of high and low type subjects. Note:
Statistically significant at the *** 0.01, ** 0.05 and * 0.1 level. In columns 2 and 3,
significance levels are based on t-tests. Significance levels for the last column are based
on the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for independent samples.
are only 3 types of individuals, with degree 3, 4 and 7, respectively. However, subjects,
on average, perceive that there are 5.293 types of individuals in the network, and the
difference is highly significant (p = 0.000). The overestimation of the number of types
is a consequence of the overestimation of the rare types, because in the network used in
the experiment the rare types are actually absent types. The second difference is that
subjects underestimate the variance around the mean degree. On average, they perceive
a variance equal to 2.198, which is significantly lower than the actual variance, equal to
2.889 (p = 0.000).
We now present additional evidence from Experiment 4 which suggests that these
cognitive biases are robust. We study robustness by asking if perception biases disappear
as subjects become more familiar with our experimental methodology. In Experiment 4
we showed subjects the network in figure 4 and then we asked them the same questions
about the degree distribution. Note that the network is exactly the same as the network
in Experiment 1 apart from the labels of the nodes. However, all subjects were assigned
to the same location in the network, which is a node of degree 7 (i.e. high type) located
next to the node assigned to low type subjects in Experiment 1.
Figure 5 is the equivalent of figure 3: it shows the aggregated data for all subjects
dividing them according to their treatment assignment in Experiment 1. Specifically,
it compares the degree distribution of the actual network (in black) with the degree
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Figure 4: Network picture shown to subjects in Experiment 4.
distribution of the cognitive networks of subjects assigned to a high (in gray) and a
low (in white) type in Experiment 1. The figure shows that the three biases originally
identified are present in Experiment 4 as well: subjects underestimate the mean degree in
the network and they overestimate (underestimate) the number of rare (frequent) types
in the network.
4 Cognition in the Field
The laboratory setting allows the researcher to control the parameters of the experiment,
but this tight control in turn raises questions about the scope of the findings. The first
issue is whether our findings on biases are sensitive to the specific networks we use and
the particular visualization of the chosen networks. This is the issue of internal validation.
The second issue is about the validity of our findings beyond the laboratory: do these
biases also arise in actual social networks or are they an artifact of the experimental
design? We may refer to this as the problem of external validation. The aim of this
section is to provide a systematic response to these concerns.
Our strategy is to ask how individuals perceive their real friendship network. We
study data from two networks – a friendship network in a Silicon Valley firm (SVF) and
a friendship network in an Italian University Research Center (URC). These networks
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Figure 5: Degree distribution for the actual network (in black) and for the cognitive
networks in Experiment 4. For ease of comparison with Experiment 1, we averaged out
the cognitive networks over all subjects assigned to be high (in gray) and low (in white)
type in Experiment 1. Note that all subjects were assigned to the same location in
Experiment 4.
were first studied in Krackhardt (1987) and Casciaro (1998), respectively, and have been
the subject of influential research in social psychology and sociology. Our main finding is
that individuals’ cognition of these real world networks, which they themselves inhabit,
exhibits biases which are similar to those we identified in our laboratory experiment. In
particular, individuals in the SVF network perceive a lower mean connectivity than the
true mean, they overestimate rare types and underestimate (almost all) frequent types.
Individuals in the URC network perceive a lower mean connectivity than the true mean,
they overestimate most rare types and underestimate most frequent types.
4.1 Constructing cognitive social networks
The tradition of using surveys to understand network cognition has a long and distin-
guished history in the social sciences (see Moreno [1960] for an early reference). In recent
years, the literature has used the following methodology which was introduced in New-
comb [1961], Roethlisberger and Dickson [1939] and Krackhardt [1987]. Researchers give
an n×n matrix to each of the n participants of a group. Each row/column of the matrix
is labeled with the name of one of the members of the group, and participants have to
input a 0 or a 1 for each cell in the matrix. Imagine that the social relation of interest
is friendship. If participant K inputs 1 in the (i, j) entry then it means that K thinks
that there is a friendship from i to j. The real social network is constructed by looking
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at the entries by i and j on their link with each other: if both i and j input 1 in the
(i, j) and (j, i) entries of their matrix then we say that there is a friendship between i
and j in the real network. We provide an example to illustrate more concretely how the
methodology works. Consider a group of three individuals 1, 2, 3 and imagine that the
cognitive network matrices are as follows.
M1 =

0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
 M2 =

0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
 M3 =

0 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 0

The real network is a line with individual 2 in the middle because (1, 2) = (2, 1) = 1
in M1, (1, 2) = (2, 1) = (2, 3) = (3, 2) = 1 in M2 and (2, 3) = (3, 2) = 1 in M3. The
cognitive network of 1 is the same as the real network. However, 2’s cognitive network is
a triangle because (1, 3) = (3, 1) = 1 in M3. On the other hand, 3’s cognitive network is
disconnected with 1 as an isolated individual because (1, 2) = 0 in M3.
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We use two survey-based data sets from well-known studies in the social psychology
literature. The first data set is from Krackhardt’s (1987) contribution and it is publicly
available in the UCINET package for analysis of network data. It includes the cognitive
network data for 21 managers at a 10-year old Silicon Valley firm producing high-tech
machinery. The second data set is from Casciaro [1998] and it includes the cognitive
network data for 24 (out of 25) members of a research center in an Italian University.14
The data sets will be hereafter referred to as the SVF (Silicon Valley Firm) and URC
(University Research Centre) respectively.
13This is not the only way to construct a real/cognitive network given the data. The choice of the
criteria to construct the networks is driven by the nature of the social relationship that the data represents.
In our case we will be looking at friendship, a relationship which is more naturally viewed as reciprocal.
Thus, a friendship between i and j in the real network exists if and only if both i and j state that both the
(i, j) and (j, i) entries are equal to 1 in Mi and Mj . Similarly, the friendship between i and j is correctly
perceived by k if and only if both the (i, j) and (j, i) entries are equal to 1 in Mk. However, if we were to
examine advice, which is arguably non-reciprocal, then we may want to define that an advice link from
i to j exists in the real network if and only if both i and j state that the (i, j) (but not necessarily the
(j, i) entry) is equal to 1 in Mi and Mj .
14The two data sets have been collected using slightly different methods. In Krackhardt (1987), each
participants had to answer a question like ”Who is X friend with?” by checking the names of X’s friends
on a list of the other managers of the organizations (including the participant). The cognitive network
matrix of a participant is constructed from the participant’s answer to 21 such questions, including the
question in which X is the participant himself. In Casciaro (1998), each participant had to fill in the
matrix representing the cognitive network directly. Specifically, the instructions stated the following: ”By
putting an ‘X’ in the cells of the following matrix, please indicate whether you think the people listed in
each row (from 1 to 25) considers the people listed in each column (from A to Z) as personal friends.”
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4.2 Analysis of survey data
In this part we replicate the analysis in section 3 on the SVF and URC network data to
investigate whether the biases that we found in the experimental data are present in the
field data as well.
Figure 6: Degree distribution for the real (in black) and cognitive (in white) friendship
networks from the SVF (above) and URC (below) data.
The first bias that we have identified in the experimental data is that individuals
underestimate the mean degree in the network, and this bias is present in both the SVF
and the URC data. In the SVF network individuals perceive the average number of friends
to be 1.06, while the true average is 1.81; this difference is highly significant (p = 0.000).
In the URC network, individuals perceive the average number of friends to be 2.56, while
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Data
Degree Krackhardt [1987] Casciaro [1998]
0 5.76*** 5.21***
1 -1.86*** 0.83
2 1.81*** -3.96***
3 -4.10*** 0.21
4 -2.43*** -1.75***
5 0.38* -2.17***
6 0.24 0.83***
7 0.05 0.67***
8 0.05 0.58**
9 -1.58***
10 0.33
Table 2: Difference between cognitive and actual networks in the SVF and URC data.
Statistically significant at the ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.1 level. Significance levels are based
on the t-test.
the true number is 3.33; this difference is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.011).15
The other two biases that we have identified in the experimental data are that partic-
ipants overestimate (underestimate) the number of rare (frequent) types in the network.
Figure 6 is the equivalent of figure 3 for the survey-based data: it compares the degree
distributions for the real (in black) and cognitive (in white) friendship networks for the
SVF (above) and URC (below) data. The top part of figure 6 shows that these biases
are present in the SVF network. Apart from type 0 individuals, the pattern is as in the
experimental data: there is overestimation of rare types and underestimation of frequent
types. Participants tend to perceive a lower number of types 1, 3 and 4, which are frequent
types in the real network. Conversely, they tend to perceive a higher number of type 2
individuals who are rare types in the real network. Table 2 shows that all these biases
are highly significant. Moreover, individuals perceive that there are type 5 individuals,
who are absent in the real network. The case of type 0 individuals is difficult to compare
with the experiment as in the laboratory there were no individuals of type 0.
The bottom part of figure 6 shows that, with a few exceptions16, there is a bias toward
overestimation of rare types and underestimation of frequent types in the URC network.
In particular, individuals perceive a lower number of types 2, 4, 5 and 9, than there
actually exist in the real network. Conversely, they tend to perceive the presence of types
6, 7 and 8 even though they are absent in the real network. Table 2 shows that all these
biases are highly significant. Finally, individuals significantly overestimate the number of
15As in section 3, the p-values are for the t-test.
16Individuals accurately perceive the number of type 1 and type 3 individuals.
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type 0 individuals. This case is not directly comparable with the experimental data, as
in the social network in the laboratory we did not have individuals of type 0.
5 Other Experimental Findings
This section discusses three other findings from our experiment. The first finding is that
network cognition exhibits significant location effects. The main effect is that subjects
assigned to be a low type exhibit a projection bias : they misperceive the type of other
low type individuals and assign them the same type as themselves. The second finding
is that the accuracy of individual cognition varies with the nature of the network: when
we redistribute links in the original network (in the sense of creating a mean preserving
spread of the degree distribution),17 individuals have a more accurate perception of the
new network. The third finding is that network cognition affects economic decisions: on
average, subjects are less likely to pick their payoff-maximizing strategy when the decision
problem is made cognitively more demanding. Moreover, individuals with less accurate
network cogntion are also less likely to pick the payoff-maximizing strategy.
5.1 Location and cognition
A major research programme in social psychology and social anthropology studies how
individual location in a network shapes his/her perception of the network (see the dis-
cussion in section 1.1). The existing literature relies, for the most part, on survey data.
As location is shaped by individual choices on socialization, existing evidence on location
effects is potentially subject to problems of endogeneity and omitted variable biases. One
goal of our experiment was to address these concerns: we exogenously assign subjects to
a different position in the network in each treatment, so that any difference in perception
between treatments can clearly be attributed to the effect of location in the network.
We test for the statistical significance of such differences by applying the Mann-Whitney
Wilcoxon test for independent samples.
We see from Table 1 that subjects assigned to be high type (d = 7) tend to underes-
timate the number of type 3 individuals in the network, but subjects assigned to be low
type (d = 3) do not. Since type 3 is one of the frequent types in the network, the underes-
timation by subjects assigned to be high type is consistent with the third bias in section
3. In contrast, subjects who are themselves assigned to be type 3 do not underestimate
the frequency of this type in the network. This difference in perception of the number of
type 3 individuals is statistically significant (p = 0.051, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test).
Figure 7 allows us to gain further insight into the nature of this bias. We have two bars
for low and high type subjects, showing the proportion of subjects that overestimate (in
light gray), underestimate (in dark gray) and accurately (in black) indicate the number of
17For formal definitions on networks, refer to section 2.
18
Figure 7: Proportion of subjects that overestimate (in light gray), underestimate (in dark
gray) and accurately (in black) indicate the number of individuals of each type in the
network. Left bar: subjects assigned to be low type. Right bar: subjects assigned to be
high type.
individuals of each type in the network. Focusing on the estimate of the number of type 3
individuals, we see that the proportion of subjects that accurately indicates the number
of type 3 individuals in the network is the same for both high and low type subjects.
However, there is a larger proportion of low type subjects that overestimates the number
of type 3 individuals in the network. If we now focus instead on the estimate of number
of type 4 individuals, the opposite holds: there is a larger proportion of low type subjects
that underestimates the number of type 4 individuals in the network. These two findings
are related: subjects that overestimate the number of type 3 individuals in the network
also tend to underestimate the number of type 4 individuals more than other subjects. In
other words, subjects assigned to be low type display a projection bias : they misperceive
the degree of other low type individuals because they mistakenly perceive them as ”like
themselves”, i.e. they ”project” their own type onto them. Interestingly, this projection
bias is not present for subjects assigned to be high type.
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Furthermore, we also have some experimental evidence on the robustness of the pro-
jection bias. As we explain in detail in section 3, in Experiment 4 we showed subjects
the network in figure 4 and then we asked them the same questions about the degree
distribution. Note that the network is exactly the same as the network in Experiment
1 apart from the labels of the nodes. However, all subjects were assigned to the same
location in the network, which is a high type (d = 7) located next to the node assigned
to low type subjects in Experiment 1. Thus, we expect that the projection bias should
disappear in Experiment 4 given that all subjects were assigned to be of high type.
Figure 5 shows that the projection bias disappears in Experiment 4. This result also
allows us to exclude the alternative explanation that the emergence of the projection bias
is due to the location of the low type node in the bottom-left part of the network image.
This is because in Experiment 4 all the subjects are assigned to the high type node which
is the closest one in the network image to the node that low type subjects were assigned
to in the first part of the experiment. If the projection bias were due to the low type
subjects’ location on the image in Experiment 1 then we should observe that all subjects
have a projection bias in Experiment 4, but figure 5 shows that this is clearly not the
case.
A second location effect is on subjects’ perception of the key individuals in the network.
We asked subjects “In your opinion, who are the key individuals in the group?”. We then
compared, for each individual in the network, the probability of being identified as a
key individual by high type and low type subjects. For most individuals in the network
these probabilities did not differ significantly. However, there are two exceptions: the
individuals named Harry and William who are of type 4 and 7 respectively. Crucially,
both are directly linked to the low type subjects and neither is linked directly to the high
type subjects. We find that low type subjects are more likely to identify Harry (p = 0.033)
and William (p = 0.026) as key individuals as compared to high type subjects. This is
evidence that low type individuals have a tendency to attribute more importance to their
own connections in the context of the overall network compared to the importance given
to those individuals by a subject who is not connected to them. The converse effect is
not present for high type individuals, possibly because high type subjects have many
connections and therefore they do not deem an individual important just because that
individual is one of their connections.18
A third location effect is that the variance of the perceived mean degree is higher for
subjects assigned to be low type. The difference is statistically significant, using Levene’s
(1960) robust test statistic for equality of variances (p = 0.061). A conjecture that we are
planning to explore in future work is that this is a consequence of the projection bias for
the specific type of network that we investigated in Experiment 1.
18An alternative explanation is that low type subjects noticed that they were directly connected to
individuals with the same name as the second and third in the line of succession to the throne of the
United Kingdom.
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5.2 Changing the structure of the network
This section examines the relation between the structure of the network and the accuracy
of network cognition. In other words, we would like to understand whether some network
architectures are easier to understand and recall as compared to others. This question
is of interest in the context of network design: for instance, if cognition costs are higher
for some networks then optimal design should reflect these costs. It is also of interest if
we wish to study the relation between network structure and individual behavior. In this
spirit, Galeotti et al. (2010), develop a number of results which relate the (subjectively
perceived) degree distribution of a network to the equilibrium behavior of individuals. In
an experimental context, when we vary the network, individual behavior may be affected
both by the change in the network itself and also by the changes in the accuracy of the
perception of the network. So it is important to understand if the accuracy of individual
cognition of a network varies with the structure of the network. We will focus on a mean
preserving spread (MPS) of the degree distribution in the network (see definition in
section 2).
Figure 8: Network pictures shown to subjects in Treatment 1 of Experiment 2 (high type).
Left: Original network shown in the first 30 seconds. Right: Mean-preserving spread of
original network shown in the last 30 seconds.
We carried out two treatments, which varied the subject’s location and the order in
which they saw the two networks. In the first treatment, subjects were assigned to be high
type, and they saw the original network before seeing the MPS network. This is the order
represented in Figure 8. In the second treatment, subjects were assigned to be low type,
and they saw the original network after seeing the MPS network. This is the order shown
in Figure 9. All subjects were then asked questions that elicited their perceptions of the
lower and upper tail of the degree distribution for each of the two networks. Specifically,
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Figure 9: Network pictures shown to subjects in Treatment 2 of Experiment 2 (low type).
Left: Mean-preserving spread of original network shown in the first 30 seconds. Right:
Original network shown in the last 30 seconds.
they were required to specify the number of individuals in the network who had fewer
than two friends, and the number of individuals who had at least three friends.
Figure 10 illustrates the results for the original network (on the left) and the MPS (on
the right) by showing the number of individuals with fewer than two friends and at least
three friends for the real network (in black), the cognitive network of high type (in gray)
and low type (in white) subjects. The most striking feature of the results is clearly the
substantial underestimate, by all subjects, of the number of individuals with at least three
friends in the original network. The actual number is 15, but the mean perceived number
is only 10.615 for high type subjects and 10.976 for low type subjects. These differences
are highly significant. In contrast, perception of the number of individuals with at least
three friends is surprisingly accurate for the MPS network: subjects of both types show
no significant bias in this case. Turning to the lower tail of the degree distribution, we
find that subjects overestimate the number of individuals with fewer than two friends in
the original network, and underestimate it in the MPS network. The differences in both
cases are statistically significant, but small in magnitude.19 In summary, subjects appear
to perceive more accurately the MPS network.
How can we account for this improvement in accuracy of network cognition? A MPS
of a network would usually lead to the types in the network being further apart, and this is
indeed the case for the MPS network in Experiment 2. Thus, it may be that as the types
19Specifically, the true number for the original network is zero, while the mean perceived number is
0.692∗∗∗ for high type subjects and 0.220∗ for low type subjects. For the MPS network, the actual
number is three, while the mean perceived number is 2.564∗∗ for high type subjects and 2.390∗∗∗ for low
type subjects.
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Figure 10: Number of individuals with fewer than two connections and at least three
connections in the real network (in black) and in the cognitive networks of high type (in
gray) and low type (in white) subjects. The results for the original network are in the
left panel, and the results for the MPS network are in the right panel.
are pushed apart it becomes easier for individuals to differentiate them and this improves
accuracy of perception of the network. Another difference between the MPS network and
the original network is that the MPS network has a larger number of types. In general,
a MPS of a network may increase, decrease or leave unchanged the number of types,
but it may be that changing the number of types leads to a variation in the accuracy of
perception of the network. The results for the specific MPS in Experiment 2 suggest that
there is an improvement in the accuracy of perception of the degree distribution when the
number of types increases. While both these conjectures are plausible, we view them as
preliminary and would like to explore them in future work.
5.3 Cognition and behavior
The focus in this paper is on network perception, but we also take a first step to examine
the relationship between accuracy of perception and behavior. We included two exper-
iments in which subjects face a decision problem where the payoff-maximizing decision
depends on their knowledge of the network. The problems are described in section 2: the
choice is straightforward if the subject can see the network when making the choice, but
it requires the ability to recall details about the network when the network picture is no
longer available.
We vary the cognitive difficulty of the task in the two experiments. In Experiment
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3, subjects are shown the network before they learn the nature of the decision problem
they will be confronted with: all they know when they see the picture is that they will be
playing an economic game with real monetary payoffs, where the effects of their decisions
and other players’ decisions will depend on the way players are connected. This makes the
cognitive task demanding, since subjects cannot focus attention on a particular feature or
subset of the network while looking at the picture. In Experiment 4, on the other hand,
subjects see the network after learning the nature of the decision problem: in particular,
they learn that the only individuals who can have an impact on their payoffs are their
friends. Other individuals’ decisions are payoff-irrelevant, so that a subject seeking to
maximize his payoff can simply focus attention on his friends.
We would therefore expect subjects to make the ”wrong” decision more often in Ex-
periment 3 than in Experiment 4. This is indeed the case: 55% of subjects fail to pick
the payoff-maximizing action in the more demanding Experiment 3, compared with 26%
in Experiment 4.20
We then check whether individual behavior in these experiments is related to cognition
in the previous experiments. We construct several measures of cognitive accuracy based
on answers to the questions about network perception in the first two experiments. For
the first experiment, which elicited subjects’ cognitive degree distribution, we use three
measures, corresponding to the three main biases identified in section 3: the first captures
inaccuracy in perception of the number of rare types in the network, the second inaccuracy
in perception of the number of frequent types in the network, and the third inaccuracy in
perception of the mean degree. For the second experiment, which investigated differences
in perception as we varied network structure, we construct three measures: the first one
captures the accuracy in answering questions about the number of low types in the original
network, the second one captures the accuracy in answering questions about the number
of high types in the original network and the third one captures the accuracy in answering
questions about the number of low types in the mean-preserving spread network.
Tables 3 and 4 report our main results on the link between network cognition in
the first three experiments and behavior in the last two. We find two highly significant
effects. First, individuals who are more prone to overestimate the number of rare types
in the network are also more likely to contribute to the local public good. This is true in
both experiments. Remembering that the payoff-maximizing decision is to contribute in
Experiment 3, and not to contribute in Experiment 4, this suggests that individuals with
a very inaccurate perception of the network have difficulty picking the payoff-maximizing
action, and resort partly to other criteria in making their choice. We conjecture that their
20Note that owing to a programming glitch, subjects in Experiment 4 were told that Olivia, Grace and
Sophie had chosen to contribute, when in fact these names did not appear in the network for Experiment
4. This may have made the problem harder and contributed to the rather high proportion of wrong
decisions. We therefore take the 26% as an upper bound on the proportion of wrong answers for the
cognitively easier task. Obviously, a lower proportion would make the difference with the cognitively
more demanding task even greater.
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Experiment 3
Probability of picking the Coeff. Stand. z P > |z|
the payoff-maximizing action Error
Exp 1: (Mean Bias)2 0.214 0.182 1.18 0.239
Exp 1: (Underestimate Frequent Types Bias)2 0.043 0.064 0.68 0.499
Exp 1: (Overestimate Rare Types Bias)2 0.137 0.072 1.90 0.057*
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception Low Degree (ON) 0.023 0.543 0.04 0.966
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception High Degree (ON) 0.070 0.377 0.19 0.852
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception Low Degree (MPS) 0.652 0.340 1.92 0.055*
Age -0.064 0.048 -1.34 0.181
Gender 0.312 0.328 0.95 0.341
Education 0.351 0.252 1.39 0.164
Econ -0.362 0.391 -0.92 0.356
Constant 0.021 1.224 0.02 0.986
n 77
R2 0.0740
Table 3: Probit regression to assess performance in Experiment 3. The binary depen-
dent variable takes value of 1 if the subject picks the correct decision, and 0 otherwise.
ON=Original Network. MPS=Mean-Preserving Network.
tendency to privilege contribution may be related to the fact that the decision problem
is framed in terms of contributions to a local public account, with potential positive
externalities on friends (and their friends).21
The second significant effect concerns perception of very low degree types. Out of
the first three experiments, only Experiment 2 had such types. Specifically, the network
obtained by taking a mean preserving spread of the base network degree distribution
did contain several individuals with degree one. The ability to perceive correctly degree
one individuals plays an important role in Experiment 3, because identifying the payoff-
maximizing action hinges on accurate perception of one such individual (Olivia). This
is not the case in Experiment 4. Indeed, we find that subjects who perceive very low
types more accurately in Experiment 2 are also significantly more likely to choose the
payoff-maximizing action in Experiment 3 (and not in Experiment 4).
21Interestingly, we find that among our subjects, the proportion of contributors is lower for economics
students than for students from other disciplines. This is true in both experiments, but the difference is
much greater for Experiment 4, where contributing is not the individual’s payoff-maximizing action.
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Experiment 4
Probability of picking the Coeff. Stand. z P > |z|
the payoff-maximizing action Error
Exp 1: (Mean Bias)2 0.025 0.171 0.15 0.884
Exp 1: (Underestimate Frequent Types Bias)2 0.083 0.086 0.96 0.335
Exp 1: (Overestimate Rare Types Bias)2 -0.416 0.223 -1.87 0.062*
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception Low Degree (ON) -0.484 0.579 -0.84 0.403
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception High Degree (ON) -0.126 0.445 -0.28 0.777
Exp 2: Accuracy Perception Low Degree (MPS) -0.568 0.379 -1.50 0.134
Age -0.035 0.042 -0.84 0.402
Gender -0.278 0.369 -0.75 0.451
Education 0.249 0.273 0.91 0.362
Econ 0.606 0.485 1.25 0.212
Constant 3.165 1.348 2.35 0.019
n 77
R2 0.0740
Table 4: Probit regression to assess performance in Experiment 4. The binary depen-
dent variable takes value of 1 if the subject picks the correct decision, and 0 otherwise.
ON=Original Network. MPS=Mean-Preserving Network.
6 Conclusion
We studied individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship net-
works using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In our experimental
work subjects are shown a network and also assigned a location in this network. They are
then asked questions about the network. The experimental data suggests that subjects
exhibit three main cognitive biases. The first one is that they underestimate the mean
degree compared to the actual network. The second one is that they overestimate the
number of rare types. The third is that they underestimate the number of frequent types.
We then analyze survey data from two ‘real’ friendship networks – the friendship network
of a Silicon Valley firm (first studied in Krackhardt [1987]) and the friendship network
in a University Research Centre (first studied in Casciaro [1998]). We find, somewhat
remarkably, that individuals in these ‘real’ networks exhibit the same cognitive biases.
Our laboratory experiment yields three further findings. First, location affects cogni-
tion: low and high type subjects differ in their perception of the network along a number
of dimensions such as perception of low degree others, the identity of key individuals
in the network, and the dispersion of mean degrees. Second, the accuracy of network
cognition varies with the architecture of the network: a mean preserving spread of the
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degree distribution leads to greater cognitive accuracy. Third, network cognition affects
economic behavior: when we make the decision problem more cognitively demanding,
subjects on average perform less well. Moreover, subjects who perceive the network more
inaccurately, as captured by the tendency to overestimate the number of rare types, find
it harder to pick their payoff-maximizing action.
Our findings suggest that exploring further the biases in the way people process,
recall and use information about social networks, and the relationship between network
cognition and economic behavior, represents a promising avenue for future research.
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A Experimental Instructions
Welcome; you are going to participate in an economics experiment. Your answers and
decisions will have no consequences whatever for your course grades or your degree.
This experiment studies decision-making. There are no right or wrong decisions – you
should simply decide according to your preferences.
The experiment will be remunerated. You will receive the remuneration at the end. I
will call in each participant individually to give him or her the amount earned. The amount
you receive will depend on your decisions/answers and on those of the other participants.
I will explain the rules of the experiment in a moment.
Please now switch off your mobile phones, and do not talk to each other during the
experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand and I will come and answer.
Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, we can start. You will see some instructions on your screens.
Take the time you need to read them carefully before clicking on “Next” to move to the
next screen. Whenever you are asked a question, take the time you need to answer. If you
see the phrase “waiting for the other participants” on your screen, please wait patiently:
it means some of the other participants have not yet clicked on “Next”. If you want to
ask a question during the experiment, please raise your hand.
General rules
During this experiment you will be asked at times to take decisions that will affect your
outcome and the outcome for other participants. It is important for you to know that
your decisions will remain completely confidential.
Each person will be assigned a fictitious name, depending on the ID code he or she
picked at the beginning.
When we need to refer to specific participants in the instructions, we will always use
their fictitious name and never their real name or any other information that might allow
others to identify them.
Please type in your ID code, exactly as it is written on the ticket you picked at the
beginning.
If you have a question, please raise your hand.
If there are no questions, we can move on to the specific instructions.
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Specific instructions (Stage 1)
There are several parts to this experiment. We will provide specific instructions for each
part before the start.
In the first part, we will show you a visual representation (a diagram) showing a set of
relationships within a group of people, including yourself. Imagine that the other people
are, like you, students of this university. In the diagram, each dot represents a person,
and has a (fictitious) name. A line joining two dots means that those two people are
connected: they are friends. We are going to show you the diagram for 60 seconds, then
the diagram will disappear from your screen, and we will ask you some questions about
the set of relationships you have just seen.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
When you are ready to see the diagram, click on “Next”.
[Subjects are shown the networks in Figure 11 for 60 seconds]
On the next screen you will be asked to describe the set of relationships you have just
seen, in your own words. You will have 60 seconds to do this.
Pressing ”Enter” will cause what you have written to be saved, and then disappear
from the text box. Saved text will be displayed in the top half of the screen. When the
60 seconds is up, please press Enter.
When you are ready to answer the question, click on “OK”.
Q1 Describe the set of relationships you have just seen, in your own words. You have
60 seconds to do this.
Q2 How many people are there altogether in the group?
Q3 In your opinion, who are the key individuals in the group?
Q4 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly one friend?
Q5 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly two friends?
Q6 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly three friends?
Q7 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly four friends?
Q8 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly five friends?
Q9 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly six friends?
Q10 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly seven friends?
Q11 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly eight friends?
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Specific instructions (Stage 2)
In the next part of the experiment, we will show you visual representations (diagrams)
of two sets of relationships within a group of people, still including yourself. Once again,
imagine that the other people are students of this university.
In the diagrams, dots and connecting lines have the same interpretation as in the
previous diagram. We are going to show you the first diagram for 30 seconds, then the
diagram will disappear from your screen, and we will show you the second diagram, also
for 30 seconds. After this diagram also disappears from your screen, we will ask you some
questions about the two new sets of relationships you have just seen.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
When you are ready to see the diagrams, click on “Next”.
[Subjects in Treatment 1 are shown the networks in Figure 12 for 30 seconds each and
subjects in Treatment 2 are shown the networks in Figure 13 for 30 seconds each]
Q1 Are there more people in the first group than in the second group?
Q2 How many people have at least three friends in the first group?
Q3 How many people have at least three friends in the second group?
Q4 How many people have fewer than two friends in the first group?
Q5 How many people have fewer than two friends in the second group?
Q6 Is the number of friends more variable in the first group than in the second group?
Q7 Is the number of friends more variable in the second group than in the first group?
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Specific instructions (Stage 3)
We are now going to show you one more visual representation (diagram) of a set of
relationships within another group of people. Once again, imagine that you are part of
the group, and the other people are students of this university.
In the diagram, dots and connecting lines have the same interpretation as in the
previous diagrams. We are going to show you the diagram for 60 seconds, then the
diagram will disappear from your screen, and we will ask you questions about the new
set of relationships you have just seen.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
When you are ready to see the diagram, click on “Next”.
[Subjects are shown the networks in Figure 14 for 60 seconds]
Q1 How many people are there altogether in the group?
Q2 Are the following people friends: Evie, Charlotte
Q3 Are the following people friends: Mia, James
Q4 How many friends does George have?
Q5 How many friends does Lucy have?
Q6 Which of the following are Ella’s friends: Charlotte, Jack, Lucy, Evie, Samuel?
Q7 Which of the following are Mia’s friends: George, Benjamin, Evie, Lucy?
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Specific instructions (Stage 4)
In the next part of the experiment, you will play an economic game, with real monetary
payoffs. We will describe the game before you start to play. It is a group game, in which
each player’s payoff depends on his or her decisions, and on the decisions of other group
members. Moreover, the effects of decisions on payoffs depend on the way players are
connected. We will use a diagram like the ones used earlier in this experiment to show
how you and the other players are connected. You will see this diagram on your screen
for 60 seconds; it will then disappear and we will explain the game to be played.
Note that you will not be shown the diagram again before playing the game.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
When you are ready to see the diagram, click on “Next”.
[Subjects are shown the network at the top of Figure 15 for 60 seconds.]
We now describe the economic game. Each player in the game is given an endowment
of 2 pounds. He or she has to decide whether to keep this endowment or to contribute
it to a local public account.
Once all contribution decisions have been made, each player earns 4 pounds if the
sum of his/her contribution, the contributions made by each of his/her friends, and the
contributions made by each friend’s friends, is equal to or more than 6 pounds.
Each player’s payoff from the game consists of his/her earnings plus the endowment
if it has not been contributed.
Examples : if you contribute and at least two other players who are your friends or
friends of your friends contribute, your payoff will be 4 pounds.
If you do not contribute and at least three other players who are your friends or friends
of your friends contribute, your payoff will be 6 pounds.
If you do not contribute and fewer than three other players who are your friends or
friends of your friends contribute, your payoff will be 2 pounds.
If you contribute and fewer than two other players who are your friends or friends of
your friends contribute, your payoff will be 0 pounds.
In a moment, we will ask you to play this game as if you knew how the other players
would play it. Specifically, we will assign contribution decisions to the other players in the
group, and tell you who chose to contribute. We will then ask you for your contribution
decision.
Here are the names of the other players who have chosen to contribute: Olivia, Ruby.
The other players have chosen not to contribute. Please specify your decision:
• I contribute my endowment to the local public account, or
• I do not contribute to the local public account
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Specific instructions (Stage 5)
We will now ask you to play a different economic game. We first describe the game, then
we will show you the ways different players are connected, and finally you will play the
game. Here we describe the economic game. As in the previous game, each player is given
an endowment of 2 pounds. He or she has to decide whether to keep this endowment
or to contribute it to a local public account.
The difference from the previous game is as follows. Once all contribution decisions
have been made, each player earns 4 pounds if the sum of his/her contribution and
the contributions made by each of his/her friends is equal to or more than 4 pounds. As
before, each player’s payoff from the game consists of his/her earnings plus the endowment
if it has not been contributed.
In a moment, we will ask you, once again, to play this game as if you knew how the
other players would play it. Specifically, we will assign contribution decisions to the other
players in the group, and tell you who chose to contribute. We will then ask you for your
contribution decision.
First, we are going to show you how all the players, including yourself, are connected,
on a diagram like the ones used previously. You will see the diagram for 60 seconds,
then it will disappear from your screen, and the names of the players who have chosen to
contribute will appear.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
When you are ready to see the diagram, click on “Next”.
[Subjects are shown the network at the bottom of Figure 15 for 60 seconds.]
Here are the names of the other players who have chosen to contribute:
Olivia, Grace, Sophie.
The other players have chosen not to contribute. Please specify your decision:
• I contribute my endowment to the local public account, or
• I do not contribute to the local public account
We now ask you some questions about the set of relationships between players in the
game you have just played.
Q1 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly one friend?
Q2 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly two friends?
Q3 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly three friends?
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Q4 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly four friends?
Q5 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly five friends?
Q6 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly six friends?
Q7 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly seven friends?
Q8 How many people in the group (including yourself) have exactly eight friends?
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Specific instructions (Stage 6)
In this final part of the experiment, we ask you to guess the proportion of correct answers
you have given to the questions you have been asked so far. We also ask you to guess
how well you have done relative to other participants. You will be remunerated for each
correct guess; the amount will be shown on your screen before you make each guess.
Please click on “Next” to see the first question.
What proportion (%) of questions so far do you believe you have answered correctly?
You will receive two pounds in addition to your other earnings if you guess correctly.
0 - 10%
11 - 20%
21 - 30%
31 - 40%
41 - 50%
51 - 60%
61 - 70%
71 - 80%
81 - 90%
91 - 100%
If we rank all participants in the session according to the proportion of correct answers
they have given, from the top (those with the highest proportion) to the bottom (those
with the lowest proportion), in which quintile do you think you will be? You will receive
2 pounds in addition to your other earnings if you guess correctly.
First quintile (top 20%)
Second quintile
Third quintile
Fourth quintile
Fifth quintile (bottom 20%)
Do you think your combined earnings from the two economic games are above or below
average? You will receive 1 pound in addition to your other earnings if you guess correctly.
Above average
Below average
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Final instructions (Stage 6)
Number of pounds earnt in Stage 4:
Number of pounds earnt in Stage 5:
Number of pounds earnt in Stage 6:
Show-up Fee:
Total:
The experiment has now ended. Thank you for your participation. We now ask you to
complete the following questionnaire. As soon as you finish the questionnaire you can
leave the laboratory.
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B Network pictures used in the experiment
Figure 11: Network pictures shown to subjects in experiment 1. Top: Treatment 1 - High
type with degree=7. Bottom: Treatment 2 - Low type with degree=3.
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Figure 12: Network pictures shown to subjects in Treatment 1 of Experiment 2 (high
type). Top: Original network shown in the first 30 seconds. Bottom: Mean-preserving
spread of original network shown in the last 30 seconds.
40
Figure 13: Network pictures shown to subjects in Treatment 2 of Experiment 2 (low type).
Top: Mean-preserving spread of original network shown in the first 30 seconds. Bottom:
Original network shown in the last 30 seconds.
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Figure 14: Network pictures shown to subjects in the pilot study. Top: Treatment 1 -
Low type with degree=3. Bottom: Treatment 2 - High type with degree=7.
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Figure 15: Top: network picture shown to subjects in Experiment 3. Bottom: network
picture shown to subjects in Experiment 4.
43
